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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

v.
STYLE-CRETE, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

10902

APPELLANT'S REPLy- BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The original briefs adequately set out the nature
of the case, its disposition in the lower court, and the
relief sought on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent asserts that appellant's brief did not
conform to procedural requirements in that not all of
1

the evidence was included, and such facts as were
included were not presented "in a light most favorable
to support" the respondent's case. Such a requirement,
like the respondent's history of eminent domain proceedings in the district courts of Utah, must exist only
in the mind of counsel. Rule 75 (p), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, was amended to restrict the statement
of facts to those "material" to the appeal.
Respondent correctly observed at page 14 of its
brief that appellant has not contended that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict. The primary
questions raised on appeal concern the refusal of the
trial court to permit evidence of, and instruct with
respect to, the availability of other property and its
effect on respondent's damages. The facts set out by
appellant were the ones material to those questions. The
jury had not been asked whether any particular factor
relied upon by respondent caused or contributed to its
damages. As to all factors except the size and shape of
the remaining land the jury might have found either
way; but it was not permitted to consider whether the
damages would have been minimized by the acquisition
of other land and the rearrangement of the respondent's
concrete plant.
Respondent's statement contains a number of
"facts" that were only opinions of particular witnesses,
contrary to the opinions of other witnesses. No inferences may be drawn from appellant's failure to have
a witness contradict the testimony of A. R. Caldwell.
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His credibility and the relevance of his testimony were
successfully attacked on cross-examination ..Moreover,
the need for such a witness was not suggested by respondent's pleadings or the pre-trial order ( R. 121123, 812, and 889-894).
The statement at page 12 of respondent's brief
that it had not offered any evidence that the property
constituted "an economic unit dependent on its size for
full value" before condemnation is true only to the extent
that respondent did not use the term "economic unit."
Style-Crete's owners, its appraiser, and its other experts
t.estified that one of the elements rendering the building
unsuitable for any use other than dead storage was the
reduced size of the parcel upon which the plant is
located.

ARGUMENT
I
1'he question of the availability of other property
was necessarily included in the issues made by the pretrial order and the pleadings.
Style-Crete's claim that "no issue of 'availability
of replacement land' was raised by the pleadings or
incorporated within the pre-trial order" (Brief, p. 15)
is not correct. In one of its answers Style-Crete suggests
it will be necessary to spend substantial sums of money
to build ramps to connect two of its parcels ( R. 10-11)
after construction of 23rd 'Vest Street. In another
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answer (R. 892) it avers that the taking of the property
for the railroad and 23rd West Street "destroys the
existing construction site for a substantial addition to
the cast stone plant," and "requires this defendant to
relocate and construct an enlarged office and other plant
facilities in another location." The pre-trial order provides (R. 122) that in each case the property being
taken bi-sects Style-Crete's property and that higherthan-usual severance damages are claimed because of
the elevation of the road.
The pre-trial order made no attempt to set out the
various factors contributing to the amount of severance
damages. The question of the availability of other
property and its effect upon the concrete plant is rmplicit in the pleadings and pre-trial order.

II
Under the "before and after rule" relied upon by
respondent evidence of the availability of other land is
material.
The difference between "damages" to remaining
property, and "value" of property taken, is recognized
in Utah constitutional and statutory provisions governing eminent domain, and in the cases which refer to
"severance damages," and the duty to "mitigate" them.
Nevertheless, there is merit in respondent's position
that the modern trend in eminent domain cases and
texts is toward a test of "before" and "after" market
values, even where portions of the damages are based
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upon m1ury to property not taken. This change in
approach, however, does not answer the question of
whether a court should take into consideration the availability of other land to replace land previously used
with the remaining parcel.
On pages 17 and 18 of its brief, Style-Crete touches
011 the problem but stops short. It recognizes, as would
be expected, that all factors "which reasonably tend to
depreciate" the remainder may be taken into account
in determining after value, but it does not acknowledge
that factors "which reasonably tend to appreciate" the
remainder should also be taken into account. The
authorities relied upon by the respondent do acknowledge it. In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.)
::I4.247, in a discussion of expenses incurred by the
owner in taking preventive measures, the writer states
that it is proper, and in many cases essential, that the
owner take preventive measures by which he may be
able to restore, at least to a certain extent, if not completely, the potentiality of such property for the use
of which he has been deprived." Although Professor
Nichols is among the "before-after" advocates, he cites
in support of his statement City of St. Louis v. St.
Louis I~I&SR Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S."V\T. 107 (1917),
so disdained by respondents.
The authority also says ( 4 Nichols on Eminent

Domain, §14.22) :
""\Vhen the damage to the owner's remaining
property can be avoided by grading or repairs,
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and the reasonable cost of such work is less than
the decrease in the market value of the real
estate, such cost forms the measure of damages."
The rule on minimization can be rationalized as
either "mitigation" (under a "damage" theory of severance), or as affecting the value of the remaining property (under a "before and after" theory). This is made
clear from the cases dealing with this problem.
In State Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate,
140 N.W.2d 680 ( S.D., 1966), which involved a partial
taking and damage to property not taken, the South
Dakota Supreme Court considered the effects of "rehabilitation, rearrangement, restoration and readjustment," saying:
"In estimating damages to the remainder, or
in other words, the depreciation in value of the
part not taken, the land owner is entitled to have
the jury apprised as to all those facts which
legitimately bear upon the market value * * *
before and after the taking, and those factors
that would ordinarily influence a prospective
customer in negotiating for the property.

" * * * it is proper to take into consideration
the expenses made necessary by the improvement
* * * in order to restore the land to its most advantageous use, or in adjusting it to the changed
conditions brought about by the taking * * * "
In Edgecomb Steel of New England v. State, 100
N.H. 480, 131 A.2d 70 (1957), the court discussed the
severance damage problem as follows:
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"The state as condemnor was not necessarily
to be held liable for damages upon the theory
that the value of what remained after condemnation was substantially reduced because it was
no longer usable for the purpose for which it was
designed. If by provision for expansion in another direction the most advantageous use of the
plaintiff's land could still be preserved, its value
was to be determined in light of that prospect."
In In re Widening of Michigan Avenue etc., 280
Mich. 539, 273 N.W. 798, 802 (1937), the Supreme
Court of Michigan said:
"\Vhere only a part of a building is taken, if
the remaining portion is of great value and there
can be advantageous reconstruction, rearrangemen and new adjustment, then the cost of altering the building and all consequential damages
because of such alteration, plus the value of the
part taken, furnishes the rule for measuring the
compensation to be awarded. If what remains
after a part is taken is worthless, the jury should
allow the whole value of the building. If not, they
should consider what may be done with the remainder and the cost of doing it."
The concept and the case were cited and quoted
with approval in Highway Department of State of
Michigan v. Dake Corporation, 357 Mich. 20, 97 N.W.
2d 748 (1959).
Another case dealing with the rehabilitation or
reconstruction of property to minimize damages is
Pima County et al v. De Concini et ux., 79 Ariz. 154,
285 P 2d 609, 611 ( 1955), wherein the court said:
7

"The rule also is that in arriving at the market
value of land which has been damaged by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain the court
has a right to admit evidence of possible expenditures which, if expended, would diminish the
damages. While the measure of severance damages is the difference between the market value
before and after the taking, evidence of expenditures which, if made, would cause a change
in market value are admissible and should be
considered by the court in arriving at such value."
The purchase of additional property is but one
kind of expenditure which might be made to diminish
damages by rehabilitation, rearrangement, restoration
and readjustment of the property.
The hypothetical buyer and seller relied upon by
respondent differ from those found in the cases. StyleCrete argues that the issue is not whether the railroad
vibrations will damage concrete, but whether the "willing buyer" would be influenced by his belief that they
would. This argument is specious. It ignores the
universal requirement that the hypothetical willing
buyer and willing seller must be "fully informed."
Certainly an informed purchaser of a concrete plant
would understand the characteristics of setting concrete
and the effect of random vibrations. Popular misconceptions would not determine the market value of a
concrete plant.
Respondent cites Southern Pacific Company v.
Arthur et al., IO Utah 2d 306, 352 P .2d 693 ( 1960),
as a case restricting application of the rule that avail-
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ability of other land should be considered. The case has
few similarities with the present one. There the property
had special value because it was the customary route
by which sheep were moved from one side of the valley
to another. The court correctly observed that evidence
of availability was immaterial "under the above facts"
because "the damage to the remaining lands cannot be
mitigated by obtaining other lands in other places."
(Emphasis added.) .Moreover, the error claimed with
respect to availability of other property was an afterthought, the condemnor having objected to introduction
of evidence of the unavailability of other land; and no
instructons having been requested concerning unavailability. (See Briefs of the Supreme Court of Utah,
Vol. 713, Case No. 9123, Brief of Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants, page 45.)
In Style-Crete's supplemental "Citation of Newly
Decided Case, etc." served on February 5, 1968, great
reliance is placed upon State of Utah v. Howes, Bingham, et al., Case No. 10831, handed down by this Court
of January 23, 1968. Insofar as the case bears upon
the technical accuracy of appellant's Requested Instruction No. 15, it is in point, because it refuses to
place on the condemnee the burden contended for in
that instruction.
But the case was decided on a narrow technical
issue of whether a condemnee has the burden of proving
a negative, viz., that other property is not available
to replace that taken by the c9ndemnor. The case does
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not suggest that evidence of the availability of other
land is not relevant, material and admissible; and in
the instant case the State Road Commission attempted
cross-examine Style-Crete's witnesses with respect to
the effect of additional property on the severance
damages, and to introduce independent evidence that
such property was available. The trial court simply
would not let the issue be tried.
Recognition of the materiality of evidence of the
availability of other land which might be economically
used with the owner's remaining land is not tantamount
to requiring him to go out and buy property which he
may not want, or cannot afford. The rule is said to
apply only if "reasonable cost of such work is less than
the decrease in the market value" Nichols, op. cit.
§14.22). And the owner need not buy; he may sell.
Admission of evidence that other property can be
obtained for use with the owner's remaining property
is proper because a hypothetical "willing buyer," interested in acquiring property of an optimum acreage,
would be influenced by the fact that other available
property could be used in conjunction with the property
he is about to purchase. The "willing seller" would also
be expected to consider this. Accordingly, the availability of other property, like other factors (such as
the cost of rehabilitation, filling the property if low,
scraping it if high, and so forth) has a direct bearing
upon the market value. Buyer and seller would fix the
price of the property in light of what had to be done
to it and what properties might have to be bought for
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use with it. The purchase of additional property qualitatively is no different than the purchase of fill material,
or the hiring of bulldozers or carpenters to rehabilitate
and reconstruct.
The obligation to minimize damages should not be
limited (as argued at page 24 of Respondent's Brief)
to cases in which there was a "formerly balanced economic land unit." "Balanced" implies something that is
not necessary for the rule, and restricts the application
of the rule beyond its obvious purpose. Size and shape
are the important factors. And there is no requirement
that the "substituted propery will be of the same
functional use and will cure the severance damage." As
pointed out above, even Professor Nichols, in talking
about minimization of damage, talks about restoration
of the property "to a certain extent, if not completely."
The cases recognize that restoration costs may be
properly inquired into if the after value of the property,
after deducting restoration costs, would require the
payment of less compensation than the payment of the
after market value of the property.
This view was incorporated into appellant's requested Instruction No. 15. Respondent's interpretation
of that instruction as set forth at pages 29 and 30
of its brief is neither reasonable nor allowable. The
requested instruction is almost an inversion of the
Nichols Formula ( §14.23) for cases in which the cost
of restoration will result in a decrease in damage to the
remainder:
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"Value of part taken + Cost of rehabilitation
- ,.,. alue recovered by reconstruction = Just
compensation."

III

The State was not "bound" by the testimony of its
appraiser.
Style-Crete argues that inasmuch as the appraiser
called by the state believed that the highest and best
use of the Parcel "B'' remainder was no longer operation
of a concrete plant, the state was precluded from introducing contrary testimony and from arguing to the
jury that one or another fact assumed by the appraiser
did not exist.
The law does not support the contention. There
was no attempt on the part of the state to "impeach"
its own witnesses. It is well-known that appraisers are
not usually "concrete" experts; and their judgments
often are based upon information obtained from others.
If such information is erroneous, the jury should be
so shown.
As was pointed out by this court in Schlatter v.
McCarthy et al., 113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968, 975
(1948):

"***but a party is not bound by every statement that his witness makes, and he may, by
testimony of other witnesses and in argument to
the jury, show that the facts were different from
those testified to by the witness. This is permitted
not for the purpose of impeaching the witness
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(although it may have that incidental effect),
but for establishing the true facts. It would be
a monstrous rule that would bind a party to every
witness produced by him. * * *"
Accord: II I TVigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), §907;
McCormick on Evidence, §47.
vVith respect to items as to which there was a
conflict in the evidence, the State had the right to argue
to the jury that the supposed damages did not exist.
The state had not been able to frame a hypothetical
question to its appraiser with respect to a complete
cure of Style-Crete's damages because the appraiser
himself had expressed the opinion that the size of Parcel
"B" precluded continued operation of its concrete plant;
and the court had not permitted the State to show that
the size problem could be cured by the acquisition of
other property.

CONCLUSION
In those instances in which the size and shape of
the remaining parcel of property, after condemnation,
affect the value of or damages to that remainder,
evidence should be presented as to the availability of
other property through which the remainder might be
rehabilitated, rearranged, restored and readjusted.
Such evidence is material, relevant, and important,
whether the Court follows a "damage" or "before and
after value" theory. In either case the availability of
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other property has an influence upon the amount of
money needed to compensate the owner.
The trial court prevented the State from presenting
evidence to support its theory that the building on
Parcel "B" could thereafter be used for a concrete plant
if Style-Crete's officers had taken reasonable steps to
protect its property and rearrange the concrete operation. If the judgment is not reversed, the probability
exists that Style-Crete will have its concrete plant and
damages for abandonment, too-a result which should
not occur unless the parties have been afforded an
opportunity to present evidence on all of the material
issues. The judgment of the trial court should be
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
BRYCE E. ROE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
510 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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